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Abstract
We examine how a downstream merger a2ects input prices and, in turn, the pro3tability of
a such a merger under Cournot competition with di2erentiated products. Input suppliers can be
interpreted as ordinary upstream 3rms, or trade unions organising workers. If the input suppliers
are plant-speci3c, we 3nd that a merger is more pro3table than in a corresponding model with
exogenous input prices. In contrast to the received literature, we 3nd that it can be more prof-
itable to take part in a merger than being an outsider. For 3rm-speci3c input suppliers, on the
other hand, results are reversed. We apply our model to endogenous merger formation in an in-
ternational oligopoly, and show that the equilibrium market structure is likely to be characterised
by cross-border merger.
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1. Introduction
Downstream mergers may a2ect not only output prices, but also input prices.
Empirical work suggests that mergers can a2ect wages, the price of one of the most
important inputs to production (see e.g. Peoples et al., 1993; McGuckin et al., 1995).
Despite this, the theoretical literature on mergers typically does not investigate possible
links between mergers on the one hand and wages and other input prices on the other,
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but rather concerns itself with how a merger a2ects the rivalry among 3rms in the
downstream market. 1 The purpose of this paper is precisely to study how a downstream
merger may trigger lower or higher input prices, and how this in turn inFuences the
pro3tability of the merger.
Can a merger that is wholly anti-competitive be pro3table? This question was raised
in a well-known paper by Salant et al. (1983). They showed that in a model with
homogeneous goods, Cournot competition, linear demand and exogenously given and
equal marginal costs, only mergers that almost lead to a full-blown monopoly would be
pro3table. This is quite a counter-intuitive result, and many authors have highlighted
the weaknesses of this model. Another prediction in the Salant et al. model is that
free-riding incentives are always present: even if a merger is pro3table it would be
even more pro3table for 3rms not to take part in the merger. 2 One aspect of the
Salant et al. model is that a merger is seen simply as the elimination of one 3rm in
an oligopoly. The merged entity is no larger or di2erent than any other 3rm that did
not participate in the merger. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) used a model where
a merged unit is larger than any of the original 3rms, in the sense that the parti-
cipants keep all their brands after the merger. 3 Assuming product di2erentiation and
Bertrand competition, they found that merger without marginal cost savings tend to be
pro3table. Even in this setting, though, it is better to free-ride on the merger than to
participate.
Perry and Porter (1985), along with Farrell and Shapiro (1990a,b) and McAfee and
Williams (1992), also challenged the view that a merged 3rm is no ‘larger’ than any
of the constituent 3rms. These studies introduce the existence of some ‘crucial assets’
that are in limited supply in order to capture the notion that some 3rms are larger than
others in a homogenous product industry. This assumption implies rising marginal cost
of output production and, consequently, there are internal cost savings from mergers
which could make a merger pro3table. 4
Our contribution is to point out that even without the possibility of internal cost
savings from a merger, lower marginal costs can also result from the fact that other
1 There are a few notable exceptions. GonzKalez-Maestre and LKopez-Cun˜at (2001) and Ziss (2001) analyse
merger in a homogeneous Cournot model where each owner delegates output decisions to a manager. The
manager’s incentive scheme, which is endogenous in the model and thereby a2ected by a merger, can
be regarded as an input price. Since the incentive scheme is set by the owner, these models are distinctly
di2erent from ours, where we have independent input suppliers that set input prices. In BKarcena-Ruiz and
GarzKon (2000), a merger a2ects wage setting. However, they analyse a merger from duopoly to monopoly.
Horn and Wolinsky (1988a) apply a bargaining model to analyse a merger from duopoly to monopoly,
either upstream (unions) or downstream (3rms). Our approach is di2erent in several ways, though. Horn
and Wolinsky consider downstream merger only in the case of a single upstream input supplier. For our
purposes, this turns out to be the least interesting case. Furthermore, since we are concerned about the
well-known free-rider problem in the merger literature, we apply a model which includes a non-merging
3rm.
2 This free rider problem was 3rst pointed out in Stigler (1950). Fridolfsson and Stennek (2002a) show
that this mechanism may delay a merger rather than prevent it completely.
3 See also Lommerud and SHrgard (1997).
4 Fridolfsson and Stennek (2002b) also work with the assumption that a merger in oligopoly can lower
marginal cost.
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parties – external to the 3rm – lower the prices they charge from the merged unit.
The core substance of the paper is an attempt to delineate under which circumstances
a downstream merger can have this bene3cial e2ect on input prices – and thereby
marginal costs – that in turn would suggest pro3table anti-competitive mergers and an
elimination of the free-rider paradox. 5 ;6
In the present paper, the downstream market is described by a three-3rm Cournot
oligopoly model with di2erentiated products. 7 Each producer is locked in a bilateral
monopoly situation with its own independent input supplier. 8 A trade union may be
a prime example, but the model is meant to have a broader applicability. The input
supplier is assumed unilaterally to set the input price that the downstream 3rm faces. 9
As is common in the vertical relations literature, this is assumed to happen prior to
the Cournot subgame in the 3nal product market. In the case where the input supplier
is a trade union, we study how outcomes are a2ected by how much weight the unions
put on achieving a high wage relative to obtaining a high level of employment. In
the case where the input supplier is a 3rm, we think pro3t maximisation is the more
natural assumption. However, it could be that the 3rm rather is sales oriented, which
corresponds to a union that puts a high emphasis on employment.
If a merger takes place, the merged entity will continue to produce both of its brands.
Each of the plants will keep its own input supplier, but we discuss the possibility that
these suppliers do or do not coordinate their behaviour. The two input suppliers of
the merged 3rm can become indirect competitors, though, because the downstream
3rm now in principle can choose if it wants to serve the market by the one or the
other of its two brands. Product di2erentiation of course limits the severity of this
indirect competition. Focussing on the central questions of whether or not mergers are
pro3table, and whether or not 3rms prefer to be among the merger participants, the
degree of product di2erentiation – as well as the degree to which input suppliers are
sales (employment) oriented – turn out to be of crucial importance.
We distinguish between three di2erent ways to organise the supply of input: the
input suppliers can be plant-, 3rm- or industry-speci3c. These distinctions also turn
5 If the supply curve of the input supplying industry is upward sloping, it is straightforward that a con-
traction of the downstream industry, following a merger, can lead to lower input prices. Here the focus is
on how input suppliers can choose to lower their prices as a strategic response to the merger.
6 A referee has drawn our attention to Creane and Davidson (2001). In this paper, a merged 3rm retains
the original 3rms as divisions with some autonomy. The headquarter can stage a Stackelberg quantity-setting
game among the divisions, and this can lead to pro3table mergers with insiders bene3tting more than
outsiders. A quite parallel research e2ort is Huck et al. (2003).
7 As we show in Lommerud et al. (2000), results are quite parallel in a model with Bertand competition
in the output market.
8 The existence of bilateral monopolies is a natural assumption if input suppliers are trade unions. Gener-
ally, the plausibility of the assumption requires a certain degree of asset speci3city, which create a ‘lock-in’
e2ect. Sunk investments which increase the value of trade between a buyer (downstream 3rm) and seller
(upstream 3rm) also create a switching cost, which decreases the value, in relative terms, of any outside
option. A typical example of such investments is irreversible R&D expenditures.
9 By letting the input supplier set prices, we have de facto applied a monopoly union model in the cases
where the input suppliers are trade unions. It can be shown that our results are valid also in a setting with
an ePcient bargaining model rather than a monopoly union, see Lommerud et al. (2000).
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out to be very important for questions about merger pro3tability. 10 Plant-speci/c
input supply means that each plant has its own independent supplier both before and
after a possible merger. This is arguably the more natural assumption where the input
suppliers are 3rms. It also seems natural in the trade union context when bargaining
structures are very decentralised, or when the merger in question is an international
one.
Firm-speci/c input supply means that the two involved input suppliers act in an
uncoordinated manner prior to the merger, but that they too merge in response to a
downstream merger. We think this perhaps is most relevant in the trade union example
for countries where bargaining takes place at a company rather than at the plant level. 11
We do not rule out that it in some cases also can be relevant for 3rms as input suppliers.
Industry-speci/c input suppliers mean that all input suppliers in the industry coordinate
their actions both before and after a possible merger. This type of bargaining structure
can be found in some European countries. It is also relevant for highly concentrated
upstream industries.
Our main focus is directed towards the case of plant-speci3c input suppliers, which
dramatically changes the results from a model with exogenous input prices. As is
well known from the trade union theory, a monopoly input supplier will choose a
price–quantity combination on the input demand schedule, and the optimal behaviour
of the input supplier is determined by the elasticity of input demand. So, how does
a downstream merger inFuence the elasticity of input demand for the two suppli-
ers involved in the merger? First, a merger leads to a negative shift in the demand
for inputs. This is derived from the dampening-of-competition e2ect in the product
market. A demand reduction in the product market in turn leads to a reduction in
demand for inputs. Second, a merger also a2ects the slope of the input demand curve
by making demand more responsive to input price changes. The reason is that the
merger enables the merged 3rm to shift production between its two plants. It can
partly replace a share of one of its product’s sale by increasing the sale of the other
product. 12
Both e2ects contribute to more elastic input demand, and the suppliers of the merged
3rm will, consequently, respond to the merger by lowering the prices they charge,
which obviously contributes positively to the pro3tability of a merger. For a large set
of parameter values this is enough to turn an unpro3table merger into a pro3table
one. The only case where a merger is not pro3table in a setting with plant-speci3c
input suppliers is when the input supplier has very strong preferences for sales. For
instance, a highly employment-oriented trade union would imply that wages are close
10 There is a comparatively large literature on international unionised oligopoly, see, e.g., Naylor (1998)
and Lommerud et al. (2003). In much of this literature the degree of bargaining centralisation is not very
important. This changes, however, once the possibility of mergers is introduced.
11 The causal link between corporate and trade union mergers is identi3ed in several empirical studies (e.g.,
Buchanan, 1974, 1981; Chitayat, 1979). See also Geroski and Knight (1984).
12 The potential for replacement depends on the substitutability between the products. In the limit with per-
fect substitutes there is a one-to-one relationship, while at the other extreme – when products are independent
in demand – there is no replacement potential at all.
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to the competitive level initially, so that a merger has only a limited e2ect on
wages.
A downstream merger will also inFuence the elasticity of input demand for the input
supplier linked to the non-participating 3rm, implying that also the outsider’s input price
will change. However, we show that the merging 3rm’s input prices are always lower
than the non-merging 3rm’s input price. This explains why the free-rider paradox
can be solved by introducing endogenous input prices. The exception is, again, the
case of highly sales-oriented input suppliers. In this case, the merger has only limited
e2ects on input prices, and the traditional result about merger in Cournot oligopoly
applies.
If the input suppliers are 3rm- rather than plant-speci3c, our results are reversed.
In this case, a merger implies a higher concentration also in the upstream market,
which reduces the rivalry between the input suppliers. A merger consequently results
in higher input prices, and more so for the merging 3rms than for the non-merging
3rm. Not surprisingly, a merger is now less pro3table than in the case with exogenous
input prices. In this case, a merger is unpro3table under Cournot competition unless
the products are highly di2erentiated and the input suppliers are highly sales oriented.
Since input prices increase more for the merging 3rms, an outsider earns more from
a merger than a participant. Thus, the traditional result in the literature is restored in
this respect.
We also apply our model to endogenous merger formation. A 3rm can merge
either with another domestic 3rm or with a foreign 3rm. Given that the input sup-
pliers are trade unions, we argue that a domestic downstream merger may lead to
union merger as well, whereas a merger between a domestic and a foreign 3rm would
not lead to such a union merger. By applying the approach introduced in Horn and
Persson (2001a) we show that for a large set of parameter values the equilibrium
market structure is cross-border merger. The reason is that such a merger would re-
duce rents among the input suppliers, while a domestic merger would have the opposite
e2ect.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we present the model with
a benchmark for comparison. In Section 3, we investigate downstream merger with
plant-speci3c input suppliers, while we in Section 4 analyse how our results change
if we have either 3rm- or industry-speci3c input suppliers. In Section 5, we apply the
model to endogenous merger formation, and in Section 6 we discuss some extensions
of our model. We o2er some concluding remarks in Section 7.
2. Some preliminaries
Consider an oligopoly industry that consists of three 3rms, each producing one brand
of a di2erentiated product. Firm i produces brand i in quantity qi. There is no entry or
threat of entry, and 3rms compete in Cournot fashion. For the moment we assume that
3rms 1 and 2 are the merger candidates. Later on, we allow for endogenous merger
formation. We assume that the merged 3rm continues to produce two brands (1 and 2),
making it ‘larger’ than either of the pre-merger 3rms. The outsider (3rm 3) continues
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to produce one brand (3). As a benchmark for comparison, we start out by considering
the case of exogenous input prices.
2.1. A benchmark
Demand for the di2erentiated product is characterised by a symmetric demand sys-
tem, where the inverse demand function for brand 1 is given by
p1 = 1− q1 − b(q2 + q3) (1)
with a corresponding demand structure for the other brands. The parameter b∈ 〈0; 1〉 is
a measure of substitutability in demand. If b→ 0 the brands are regarded as (almost)
unrelated, whereas b→ 1 corresponds to the case of (almost) homogeneous goods.
There is only one factor of production, and one unit of input is supplied to the
downstream 3rm at a price w. We assume homogeneous inputs and identical technolo-
gies, so the only factors that tie a certain brand to a 3rm are patent rights or sunk
marketing investments.
We adopt a very simple linear production function, given by
qi = li; (2)
where qi is total quantity produced (of brand i) by 3rm i, and li is the total amount
of input employed by 3rm i. In this case, output and input are equivalent.
As a benchmark for later comparison, consider the following result.
Lemma 1. If input prices are exogenous and equal across /rms, a downstream merger
is pro/table if b¡ 0:55, and more pro/table for the outsider than for a participant.
Proof. Results follow directly from Lommerud and SHrgard (1997).
An outsider’s best response to a reduction in sales by the merging 3rm is to increase
its sales, thereby reducing the pro3tability of a merger. The e2ect of the outsiders’
response may dominate so that a merger is unpro3table. However, each outsider’s
response is dampened if products are di2erentiated. This explains why a merger can
be pro3table under Cournot competition if products are suPciently di2erentiated. 13
Irrespective of the nature of competition, the outsider will be a free-rider on the
merger. It will experience higher prices and higher sales, and will therefore gain more
from the merger, compared with the insiders.
13 Note that the benchmark for our analysis is not a Salant et al. (1983) type of model, where merger only
leads to one 3rm disappearing, but a Lommerud and SHrgard (1997) type of model where a merged 3rm is
‘larger’ than other 3rms because it now controls two brands. There is a close parallel to Baye et al. (1996),
where keeping a divisionalised structure, for example after a merger, plays much the same role as keeping
‘brands’ in our previous model. Another related model is found in Deneckere and Davidson (1985), where
the merged 3rm has two subsidiaries each selling its own brand. In contrast to our basic model, though,
3rms compete in prices (Bertrand).
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2.2. The upstream market
We model the upstream market in such a way that input suppliers can be interpreted
as either traditional pro3t maximising 3rms, or as trade unions which maximise union
welfare. The most convenient way is to model the input supplier as a trade union,
and then treat the pro3t maximising 3rm as a special version of the utility maximising
trade union. For the moment then, let us consider the trade union. We assume that
wages are unilaterally set by monopoly unions. 14 They are characterised by identical
Stone–Geary utility functions, given by
Ui = (wi − Sw)(li)1−; (3)
where the parameter ∈ 〈0; 1〉 captures the relative importance of wages and employ-
ment to the unions. 15 The reservation wage, Sw, is equal to the wage that could be
earned in the competitive sector of the economy. For simplicity, Sw will be set equal
to zero.
Now it is easily seen that, with Sw = 0, a pro3t maximising input supplier would be
analogous to a union that maximises rents. Further, setting = 12 , we have a maximi-
sation problem that is equivalent to the one facing pro3t maximising upstream 3rms
that are allowed to set the prices of the input they deliver to downstream 3rms. When
→ 0, this means that the upstream input suppliers only care about sales/employment.
This approximates the situation one would get if the input supplier is a price taker at
a competitively given price.
The structure of the upstream market is assumed to be exogenously given. 16 Our
main focus is directed towards the case which we 3nd most interesting, namely that
of plant-speci3c input supply, in which input suppliers are unable to coordinate their
prices across di2erent plants. This structure might be the natural one when the input
suppliers are upstream, pro3t maximising 3rms, since there are no institutional mech-
anisms implying that a downstream merger should trigger a merger between input
suppliers. In addition, in markets where 3rms are located in di2erent countries, there
are obviously both geographical and cultural obstacles to input supply cooperation. In
particular, whereas international merger is a highly prevalent phenomenon among 3rms,
we hardly ever observe a formal cooperation between trade unions across borders. 17
One main reason is probably that capital is highly mobile between countries, whereas
labour is generally not.
With domestic mergers, though, a natural modelling approach might in some cases
be to assume 3rm-speci3c input suppliers. For example, trade unions are typically
14 As pointed out by, e.g. Dowrick (1989), this can be viewed as a limiting case of the wage-bargaining
union, where the union has all the bargaining strength.
15  can be viewed as a measure of labour market distortion caused by unions. When  → 0 the wage
approaches the competitive level.  is assumed to be equal for all unions.
16 The observation of great variation in the organisation of upstream markets – for example trade union
structure – across di2erent countries and industries indicates the importance of various institutional determi-
nants of the organisation of input suppliers.
17 In 1999, the share of all mergers and aquisitions, in terms of value, that was cross-border reached nearly
31% (UNCTAD, 2000).
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organised within a 3rm. 18 A downstream merger would then naturally lead to union
merger as well. Moreover, it turns out that the merged 3rms’ input suppliers are worse
o2 following a downstream merger. It is then natural also to investigate the case
where a downstream merger automatically is followed by an upstream merger which
is captured in the model with 3rm-speci3c input suppliers.
Since a merger is a long-term commitment, it is natural for the merger candidates
to anticipate the input suppliers’ response to a downstream merger. Accordingly, we
let the merger decision be taken at the 3rst stage of the game. Moreover, we would
expect the input suppliers to anticipate how their price setting a2ects the price setting
in the downstream market. These assumptions imply the following sequence of moves:
Stage 1: Firms 1 and 2 decide whether or not to merge.
Stage 2: The input suppliers set input prices.
Stage 3: The downstream 3rms set quantities.
3. Plant-specic input suppliers
With plant-speci3c input suppliers, input prices are determined at plant level. The
decision of whether or not to merge, is assumed to be based on a payo2 comparison
with the no-merger benchmark equilibrium. In the no-merger game, 3rm i chooses li
to maximise
i = (pi − wi)li; (4)
where wi is the input price set by 3rm i’s input supplier, which maximises
Ui = (wi)(li)1−: (5)
In the post-merger game, the merged 3rm chooses l1 and l2 to maximise
m = (p1 − w1)l1 + (p2 − w2)l2; (6)
where w1 and w2 are the input prices set by the input suppliers at plants 1 and 2,
respectively. These input suppliers set their prices simultaneously, and non-
cooperatively, by maximising
U1 = (w1)(l1)1− (7)
and
U2 = (w2)(l2)1−: (8)
Regarding the input price response to a merger, we have the following result: 19
18 Unions are not 3rm-speci3c in all countries. In countries with very decentralised bargaining structures,
as the US and the UK (to the extent that these still are unionised countries), this might perhaps best be
represented as plant-speci3c unionism, especially when there is a substantial product di2erentiation among
the divisions in a merged entity. The recent strike at Boeing, following the merger with McDonnell Douglas,
can perhaps best be interpreted as a plant-speci3c union struggling, after a merger, to avoid cut-backs in
employment at precisely their own plant.
19 All remaining proofs are presented in Appendix B. Regarding notation, subscript i refers to the symmetric
no-merger outcome, whereas all other subscripts refer to the post-merger outcome.
K.E. Lommerud et al. / European Economic Review 49 (2005) 717–743 725
Lemma 2.
(i) w3¿wi if ¡ 12 or b is su<ciently low.
(ii) wi ¿w1 = w2.
(iii) w3¿w1 = w2.
The merging 3rms’ input prices fall, while the input price set by the outsider’s input
supplier will increase or decrease, depending on the degree of product di2erentiation,
and union preferences in the case of trade unions. Importantly, though, the merged 3rm
always faces lower input prices than the outsider.
The intuition behind these results can be traced by considering the input suppliers’




1−  ; (9)





Given the input prices set by other input suppliers, w−i, supplier i will set a price wi
that equates the perceived input demand elasticity with its relative preferences for prices
over total sales. By setting an input price, the input supplier in e2ect chooses a price–
quantity combination on the relevant input demand schedule. Given the preferences,
input demand elasticity governs optimal behaviour.
A merger in the downstream market will lead to a change in input prices only if
the elasticity i is changed as a result of the merger. From (10) we see that the price
elasticity of input demand depends on the demand schedule li(wi;w−i) in two di2erent
ways.
First, there is an e2ect through changes in the slope of the demand curve. If the
demand for input i becomes more (less) responsive to price changes, i.e. if |@li=@wi|
increases (decreases), this will, ceteris paribus, make input demand more (less) elastic
which leads to a reduction (increase) in the price set by supplier i.
Second, there is a demand shifting e2ect. For a given set of input prices, an increase
(decrease) in demand for input i will make the demand facing supplier i less (more)
elastic. Ceteris paribus, this leads supplier i to set a higher (lower) input price.
Let us start out by investigating the 3rst e2ect. From the input demand functions of





2(2− b)(1 + b) : (11)
A downstream merger gives rise to asymmetric input demand in the industry, and from







4(2 + 2b− b2)(1− b) ; (12)





(2 + 2b− b2) : (13)









b2(2 + b)(3− b)
4(2 + 2b− b2)(1− b)(2− b)(1 + b) ¿ 0:
As a result of the downstream merger, the input demand facing a supplier of one
of the merging 3rms becomes more price responsive. Ceteris paribus, this leads to
an increase in the elasticities 1 and 2 which lowers the optimal input prices set by
the suppliers of the merger participants. This e2ect is due to the fact that the merged
3rm is able to shift production between its two plants, making the input demand more
responsive to input price di2erentials between the two suppliers of the merged 3rm.
The strength of this e2ect depends on the substitutability in demand of the 3nal goods.
A lower degree of product di2erentiation implies that the merger-induced competition
between the input suppliers intensi3es. In the extreme case where products are homo-
geneous, there is no scope for input price di2erentials, since the merged 3rm in that
case will produce only at the low-cost plant. In this case, both input suppliers are
forced to set prices at the reservation level.
The demand shifting e2ect is also present. For a given wage vector w, a downstream
merger implies a reduction of output, and thus a reduction of input demand, from
the merged 3rm. This is due to the familiar e2ect of a merger, where the merger
participants coordinates their production volumes in order to internalise a negative
externality. Ceteris paribus, this also leads to an increase in 1 and 2, as seen from
(10), implying lower input prices for the merged 3rm. Since both e2ects pull in the
same direction, we will always observe lower input prices after a merger in an industry
with plant-speci3c input suppliers.
At least for relatively high values of b, though, the 3rst e2ect (more price-responsive
input demand) is clearly the important one. This is seen most clearly by considering the
limit case of homogeneous products. From (12) we see that b→ 1 implies −@l1=@w1=
−@l2=@w2 →∞. Thus, the suppliers of the merged 3rm face perfectly elastic demand
for their inputs when the 3nal products are homogeneous.
We now turn to study the e2ect of a downstream merger on the input price of the











2(2 + 2b− b2)(2− b)(1 + b) ¡ 0:
The input demand facing the supplier of the outside 3rm becomes less price respon-
sive as a result of the merger. Ceteris paribus, this leads to a decrease in 3, which
raises the optimal input price set by supplier 3. This follows from reduced product mar-
ket competition due to the merger. A more concentrated downstream industry means
that the market share of a non-participating 3rm is less responsive to a change in the
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3rm’s production costs, which implies that input demand is less responsive to changes
in input prices. 20
The initial demand shifting e2ect goes in the same direction. For a given set of
input prices, the optimal response to the merger is for the outside 3rm to expand output
which implies a decrease in 3. However, this is not the whole story. The competi-
tion between input suppliers causes additional strategic responses that could overturn
the initial demand shifting e2ect for the outside 3rm. Since input prices are strategic
complements, the incentive to set a higher price by the supplier to the outside 3rm
is moderated by the input price reduction for the merged 3rm, and vice versa. How-
ever, because of the post-merger asymmetry – with incentives for input price responses
being larger for the suppliers to the merged 3rm – this e2ect is clearly more pronounced
for the outside 3rm. Consequently, if the input price reduction for the merged 3rm is
suPciently large, the strategic complementarity in input price setting could cause a
reduction of input prices also for the outside 3rm, compared with the no-merger equi-
librium. From Lemma 2, we see that this will be the case if  and b are suPciently
high. This con3rms the intuition: the degree of strategic complementarity in input prices
is increasing in , whereas a large value of b implies that the incentives for input price
reductions are strong for the suppliers to the merged 3rm. 21
Having established the e2ect of a downstream merger on input prices set by plant-
speci3c upstream suppliers, we are now ready to state the following result about the
pro3tability of such a merger.
Proposition 1. With plant-speci/c input suppliers, a merger is (i) always pro/table for
the participants unless b¿ 0:55 and  is close to zero, and (ii) more pro/table for a
participant than for the outsider unless  is very low.
We see from Proposition 1 that the results in the received literature – referred to in
Lemma 1 – are reproduced when  approaches zero. 22 As already noted, in this case
an input supplier (trade union) only cares about sales (employment). Consequently, a
price (wage) close to the reservation price (wage) results both before and after the
merger. We are in fact close to what the situation would have been with an input
supplier (trade union) without market power. In this case, a merger (in the limit)
has no e2ect on input prices, and it is pro3table only if the products are suPciently
di2erentiated (b¡ 0:55).
If input suppliers are pro3t maximising 3rms – the case of = 12 – we see from the
proposition that a merger is always pro3table for the merging 3rms, and it is always
more bene3cial to participate in the merger, rather than being an outsider. Obviously,
the driving force is the input price changes reported in Lemma 1. The merged 3rm
20 This e2ect is in line with 3ndings in related union-oligopoly models, where input prices are wages (see
e.g. Dowrick, 1989).
21 From the 3rst-order conditions for optimal input prices it is easily con3rmed that @2wi(wj ; b; )=
@wj@¿ 0; i = j.
22 This is illustrated in Fig. 1, where =0 can be interpreted as the case with exogenous input prices. We
see that there is a cuto2 point at b = 0:55. For b¡ 0:55, a merger is pro3table.
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Fig. 1. Merger pro3tability with plant-speci3c input suppliers.
will face lower input prices, and these prices are lower than the corresponding input
price for the outside 3rm.
If the input suppliers are trade unions, we see from the proposition that it matters
whether or not they are employment oriented. If an input-supplying 3rm is not a
pro3t maximiser, it matters correspondingly how it weighs a higher price against lower
sales. Here, we concentrate on the trade union example. We 3nd the existence of a
hump-shaped relationship between  and post-merger wage responses. 23 This, in turn,
determines a similar relationship between  and merger pro3tability. For low levels of
, pre-merger input prices are close to the competitive level, and there is not much room
for wage reductions. As  increases, the larger is the merger-induced wage reduction,
increasing the pro3tability of the merger. However, for very high values of , the unions
have a strong preference for high wages, and even though there are considerable room
for wage reductions, a merger will only trigger small wage adjustments. Nevertheless,
for values of  close to 1, even a marginal reduction in post-merger wages will make
a merger pro3table for the participants.
Product di2erentiation triggers two opposing forces in our model, and the strength of
these forces are determined by the degree of di2erentiation. On the one hand, a lower
degree of product di2erentiation makes the outsider’s aggressive response stronger,
which tends to make a merger less pro3table (cf. Lemma 1). On the other hand, if
products are close substitutes, the degree of competition between input suppliers is
3erce, making a merger highly e2ective as a disciplinary device towards the input sup-
pliers. From Proposition 1 it is apparent that these two e2ects tend towards cancelling
each other out, making a merger pro3table for every degree of product di2erentiation,
the exception being highly sales (employment) oriented input suppliers (unions). As
shown in Fig. 1, a merger is pro3table even if products are (almost) identical as long
as  is above a certain threshold level.
23 This is quite natural. A change in wages takes place if a merger changes the trade-o2 between wages and
employment. This trade-o2 is of importance when both wages and employment matter for the trade unions,
which is especially the case for medium values of . Equilibrium input prices and pro3ts are provided in
Appendix A.
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Fig. 2. Insider versus outsider pro3tability of a merger when input suppliers are plant-speci3c.
From Lemma 2 we know that the input price reduction following a merger is
always larger for the merged 3rm, compared with the outsider. This helps explain
the result illustrated in Fig. 2. A participant gains more from a merger, compared with
the non-participant. This is always true for the pro3t maximising input supplier, and
true for the case of trade unions as long as the unions are suPciently wage oriented.
Furthermore, from Fig. 2 we also see that if  and b are suPciently high, a downstream
merger will actually harm the outside 3rm, in terms of pro3ts.
4. Other types of input supply structures
As demonstrated in the previous section, a downstream merger may lead to a
reduction in upstream rents when input suppliers are plant-speci3c. This suggests that
a downstream merger could provide the input suppliers with extra incentives for input
price coordination. One way to do so is for the merging downstream 3rms’ input sup-
pliers to merge. 24 In this case, the input suppliers are 3rm- rather than plant-speci3c. In
this section, we contrast the outcome derived in the previous section for plant-speci3c
input suppliers with the case of 3rm-speci3c input suppliers. 25 In addition, we brieFy
describe the case of a single input supplier for the entire industry.
4.1. Firm-speci/c input suppliers
If input suppliers are 3rm-speci3c, a merger between two or more 3rms will
implicitly lead to a higher degree of centralisation in input price setting, since
the merged 3rm only confronts one input supplier in the post-merger game. In
the second stage of the post-merger game, the merged 3rm chooses l1 and l2
24 Collusion is another way this can be achieved, but this is not further pursued in the present paper. For
such an analysis within the context of a unionised international duopoly, see Straume (2002).
25 See once again the references in footnote 11 about how company mergers in many settings also imply
a trade union merger.
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to maximise
m = (p1 − wm)l1 + (p2 − wm)l2; (14)
where wm is the input price set by the merged 3rm’s input supplier, which maximises
Um = (wm)(l1 + l2)1−: (15)
Lemma 3. wm¿w3¿wi.
After the merger, equilibrium input prices increase for both the insiders and the
outsider, but the merged 3rm faces a higher input price than the outsider. Comparing
with Lemma 2, the results are reversed when we go from plant- to 3rm-speci3c input
suppliers.
The intuition for the results in Lemma 3 can be developed along the same lines as
our discussion of input price responses with plant-speci3c input suppliers. From the
input demand functions in the post-merger game with 3rm-speci3c input suppliers (see
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A downstream merger means that input demand becomes less price responsive for
all 3rms. This implies, ceteris paribus, a decrease in the input demand elasticity, which
provides the input suppliers with an incentive to increase prices. The mechanisms are
analogous to the case of the outside 3rm for plant-speci3c input suppliers.
The incentives for input price increases are partly mitigated by the demand shifting
e2ects of the merger. The incentives for output reductions by the merged 3rm should,
ceteris paribus, lead to lower input prices. We 3nd that this e2ect is not strong enough
to overturn the former e2ect. In our model, we thus 3nd that a downstream merger
leads to increased input prices for all 3rms if input suppliers are 3rm-speci3c.
After the merger, there is an asymmetry between the 3rms. The merged 3rm o2ers
two brands while the outsider o2ers one brand. For a uniform input price in the industry,
this would imply that the input price/sales ratio is lower for the merged 3rm’s input
supplier. It will then be optimal for the merged 3rm’s input supplier to set a price in
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Fig. 3. Merger pro3tability with 3rm-speci3c input suppliers.
excess of the input price facing the outside 3rm. Consequently, the input price increase
due to the merger is larger for the merged 3rm than for the non-merged 3rm.
Implications for merger pro3tability are stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. With /rm-speci/c input suppliers, a merger is (i) pro/table for the
participants only if b¡ 0:55 and  is close to zero, and (ii) more pro/table for the
outsider than for a participant.
In Fig. 3 we have shown the set of parameter values for which the merger is
pro3table for the participants. We see that except for a few combinations of low 
and low b, a merger is unpro3table. It suggests that if the input suppliers are pro3t
maximising 3rms, a merger is never pro3table in the presence of 3rm-speci3c input
suppliers. If the input suppliers are trade unions, we have to impose extremely strong
assumptions regarding union preferences for a merger to be pro3table. This is no
surprise, given that a merger triggers an input price increase for the merged 3rm that
is larger than the corresponding input price increase for the outside 3rm.
Comparing with Fig. 1, we see the importance of the input supply structure. While it
is very likely that a merger is pro3table with plant-speci3c input suppliers, it is highly
unlikely that a corresponding merger in an industry with 3rm-speci3c input suppliers
is pro3table.
Note also from part (ii) of Proposition 2 that, in contrast to our results with plant-
speci3c input suppliers, it is better being the outsider than being a participant in the
merger. This is, however, in line with the results in the received literature. Since we
know that a merger with exogenous input prices is more pro3table for an outsider than
for an insider, it is obvious that this conclusion still holds when a merger results in a
higher input price increase for the merged 3rm than for the non-merged 3rm.
4.2. An industry-speci/c input supplier
If there are no obstacles to cooperation between the input suppliers, it is obvious
that the input suppliers could gain by coordinated behaviour. If input suppliers are
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pro3t maximising 3rms, anti-trust policy would normally prevent the input suppliers
from establishing a cartel or to merge to a monopoly. If the input suppliers are trade
unions, on the other hand, there are in many countries no constraints on the cooperation
between di2erent trade unions. If all the 3rms in the industry recruit workers from an
integrated labour market with a high degree of worker mobility, we would reasonably
expect the workers to be organised in a single encompassing union (cf. Horn and
Wolinsky, 1988b).
It is easily shown that, in this model, an industry-speci3c input supplier will set the
input price
w = ; (18)
regardless of the number of 3rms in the industry. Thus, a merger would not a2ect
input prices at all.
A downstream merger causes a reduction of total output, which implies a negative
shift in the demand for inputs. Ceteris paribus, this makes input demand more elastic
and should lead to a reduction of the input price. However, it can easily be shown
that the slope of the demand curve also changes, causing input demand to become
less price responsive. These two e2ects cancel out, leaving the input price unchanged.
It is important to note that this is in fact a fairly general result, and is not dependent
on the speci3c demand system assumed in this model. In a recent paper, Dhillon and
Petrakis (2002) show that this result holds for a broad class of industry and demand
speci3cations.
5. An application: Domestic versus international merger
A corollary of our model is that international mergers can be more pro3table than
domestic mergers. This prediction can be explored in greater detail by looking at a
more speci3c set-up. Assume that, pre-merger, 3rms 1 and 2 are located in a ‘domestic’
country, whereas 3rm 3 is located in a ‘foreign’ country. To make things simple, we
abstract from trade costs and assume that the 3rms compete in a single market. 26
In our setting, the di2erence between a domestic and an international merger can
be found in the organisational responses in the upstream market. Let us now interpret
input suppliers as trade unions. In line with our previous discussion we assume that a
cross-border downstream merger does not lead to a merger between the trade unions
of the merging 3rms, whereas, in the case of a domestic downstream merger, this will
indeed be the case. 27
26 This corresponds to the ‘third-market’ model of Brander and Spencer (1985).
27 There are a few other recent contributions to the analysis of the pattern of cross-border mergers. NorbVack
and Persson (2002) study the e2ects of di2erent liberalisation programs, with an emphasis on a comparison
between green3eld investments and cross-border merger. Horn and Persson (2001b) focus on domestic versus
cross-border merger, but this is done under the assumption of exogenous production costs. In another related
paper, Straume (2003) endogenises production costs by introducing unionised labour, but the focus is here
on international merger only, in an industry with both unionised and non-unionsed 3rms. Finally, Huck and
Konrad (2002) consider the choice between national and cross-country merger when strategic trade policy
possibly could be inFuenced.
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In order to make predictions about merger formation in this particular variant of
our model, we will make use of an approach developed by Horn and Persson (2001a),
which treats the merger process as a cooperative game of coalition formation, where the
players are free to communicate and write binding contracts. Using the terminology of
Horn and Persson, we let an ownership structure Mi be a partition of the set N={1; 2; 3}
of owners (3rms) into coalitions. Excluding the possibility of complete monopolisation,
there are three possible categories of market structures, with a combined total of four
di2erent ownership structures:
1. The decentralised structure (no merger): Mn = {1; 2; 3}.
2. A domestic merger: Md = {(1 + 2); 3}.
3. A cross-border merger: Mc = {(1 + 3); 2} and M ′c = {1; (2 + 3)}.
Without going into details about the theoretical foundations, the approach involves
a comparison of any two possible ownership structures Mi and Mj, where Mi is said
to dominate Mj (Mi domMj) if the combined pro3ts of the decisive group of own-
ers are larger in Mi than in Mj. The decisive group of owners are the owners that
are expected to be able to inFuence whether Mi will be formed instead of Mj, and
vice versa.
Which are the decisive owners? We do not allow payments between coalition, so
owners belonging to identical coalitions in the two structures cannot a2ect whether
Mj will be formed instead of Mi, but all remaining owners can inFuence this choice
and are thus decisive. If they participate in a non-singleton coalition in Mj that does
not exist in Mi, this coalition requires the consent of all members of the coalition to
be formed. Alternatively, if they stand alone in Mj and thus lose partners by moving
from Mi to Mj, they can forgo surplus in Mi in order to prevent Mj from being
formed. 28
Finally, the solution concept is the core. Those structures that are in the core (i.e.
the structures that are undominated) are de3ned as equilibrium ownership structures.
Using this criterion, we are able to state the following.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium market structure implies cross-border merger, unless
b¿ 0:55 and  is close to zero, for which the equilibrium market structure implies
no merger.
Given the previous results regarding the e2ects of downstream mergers on input
prices, this result is quite intuitive. In the model of endogenous merger formation that
we use, mergers are conducive to market structures with large industry pro3ts. In our
model such market structures are characterised by cross-border merger, since this is a
more ePcient way to reduce rents among the input suppliers. 29
28 See Horn and Persson (2001a) for a formal de3nition of decisive owners.
29 It can easily be veri3ed that less rents to input suppliers would lead to more pro3ts to downstream 3rms.
This follows directly from (A.3) in Appendix A, where we have that @i=@¡ 0.
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6. Extensions
Our basic model is rather stylised, so it is natural to check the robustness of our
results. Let us, therefore, explain how results may change when we extend our basic
model in three di2erent directions. For more details, see Lommerud et al. (2000).
6.1. Bertrand competition
We know from the literature that if Bertrand competition prevails in a di2erentiated
products industry, then a merger with exogenous input prices is always pro3table. With
plant-speci3c input suppliers, we 3nd that this result is reinforced. More interestingly,
we 3nd that – as is the case with Cournot competition and endogenous input prices
– an insider can be better o2 than an outsider as a result of a merger. If the input
suppliers are 3rm-speci3c, though, a merger can be unpro3table even in a setting with
Bertrand competition. The driving force is the input price increase following a merger.
Hence, our main results hold also in this extended version of our model. The reason is
that the change in input prices following a merger most of all depends on the rivalry
between the input suppliers, and the nature of this rivalry – input prices being strategic
complements – is independent of the nature of competition in the downstream market.
6.2. E<cient bargaining
In the basic model we have assumed that the input suppliers unilaterally set the input
price while the downstream 3rms have complete discretion over sales decisions. In the
case of trade unions, this is a special case of the right-to-manage model. The union
and the 3rm bargain over the wage while the 3rm sets employment. In the literature
this model is often contrasted with the ePcient bargaining model, where the union has
the same relative bargaining strength over wage setting as well as employment deci-
sions (and possibly other relevant decision variables). The existing literature suggests
that which bargaining game will emerge as the equilibrium outcome depends on the
characteristics of the industry in question. 30
It is then natural to check whether our results still hold if we apply an ePcient
bargaining model rather than a monopoly union model. We have only investigated the
case of plant-speci3c unions. It turns out that the qualitative results depend on the
relative bargaining strength of the players. However, we 3nd that our main results are
still valid. A merger can be pro3table even in a Cournot setting without any exogenous
3xed costs savings, and the insider may earn more from a merger than an outsider.
The intuition is that ePcient bargaining introduces two additional opposing forces. On
the one hand, the unions can extract a share of the potential pro3t increase following a
merger. This tends to make a merger less pro3table in a setting with ePcient bargaining.
30 Bughin (1999) 3nds that ePcient bargaining is the most-likely equilibrium outcome, and even more so
under the threat of entry. Petrakis and Vlassis (2000) 3nd that right-to-manage bargaining is the equilibrium
outcome if the unions’ bargaining power is suPciently high, while Espinosa and Rhee (1989) 3nd that
ePcient bargaining may emerge as an equilibrium outcome in in3nitely repeated games.
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On the other hand, the merged 3rm will enjoy an improved bargaining position since
it can bargain with two di2erent unions. 31 These two opposing forces tend towards
cancelling each other out for a large set of parameter values.
6.3. Multi-plant mergers
We have shown that the presence of plant-speci3c input suppliers considerably
increases the pro3tability of a downstream merger between two single-plant 3rms. We
have also argued that this might be particularly relevant for cross-border mergers. The
pro3tability of a merger in the plant-speci3c case is caused by the merger-induced
decrease in input prices which is strongly related to the merged 3rm’s ability to
re-allocate production between di2erent plants. A natural question is whether our
results are also valid in the case of mergers involving multi-plant 3rms. This can
be analysed by considering the following example.
Assume that four brands are produced by three di2erent 3rms. One 3rm is a multi-
plant (and multi-product) 3rm, whereas the two other 3rms are single-plant producers.
The e2ects of di2erent types of downstream merger on input prices and merger prof-
itability in this case are calculated in Appendix C. In order to improve the analytical
tractability, we have considered the special case of rent-maximising input suppliers,
i.e. = 12 .
Regarding the input price responses to a downstream merger, we 3nd that our
previous results are con3rmed. Whether we consider a merger between a two- and a
single-plant 3rm, or a merger between two single-plant 3rms, input prices will decrease
for merger participants and increase for non-participants as long as b¡ 1. Regarding
merger pro3tability, we 3nd that both types of merger are always pro3table for = 12 .
However, this kind of set-up also raises the issue of which kind of merger is
more likely to be undertaken. Using the endogenous merger model of Section 5, and
excluding the possibility of full monopolisation, we 3nd that a merger between a two-
and a single-plant 3rm is the equilibrium outcome if products are suPciently di2eren-
tiated. In this case, the merger process is mainly motivated by a quest for increased
market power, and the owners can maximise total industry pro3ts by forming a highly
concentrated market structure. Since the outside 3rm will face increased input prices
post-merger, this market structure implies a near-monopoly position for the merger
participants.
On the other hand, if products are suPciently close substitutes, the merger process
is mainly driven by cost-saving motivations, since production costs can be substantially
reduced by eliminating all single-plant 3rms from the industry. Consequently, the equi-
librium outcome is a merger between the two single-plant 3rms. In other words, the
model predicts a positive correlation between the degree of product di2erentiation and
the degree of asymmetry in the market structure. Numerical simulations con3rm that
this is a general tendency also for  
= 12 .
31 See also Davidson (1988).
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7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that the organisation of the upstream market is decisive
for input price responses to a downstream merger, and hence for the pro3tability of
such a merger. While plant-speci3c input suppliers tend to increase the pro3tability of
a merger, and may even make it more pro3table to take part in a merger than being
an outsider, the results are reversed in a setting with 3rm-speci3c input suppliers.
Our results suggest that downstream 3rms considering to merge in an industry with
upstream market power should be concerned about how the input suppliers respond
to a possible merger. The existence of plant-speci3c input suppliers is obviously an
argument in favour of a merger, from the viewpoint of downstream 3rms. The reason
is that a downstream merger triggers stronger competition between the input suppli-
ers of the merging 3rms, thereby reducing the rent captured by the input suppliers.
However, the argument in favour of downstream merger is also an argument in favour
of merger between the input suppliers. By doing so they can prevent the reduction in
their own rent. The plant-speci3c input suppliers are then not plant-speci3c after the
merger, but instead de facto 3rm-speci3c input suppliers. The downstream 3rms should
anticipate such an outcome. We extend our model to an endogenous merger model of
international versus national mergers to take this into account. We show that the equilib-
rium market structure might be cross-border merger. The reason is that merger between
input suppliers is less likely in cross-border mergers. If so, the downstream 3rms merge
across borders to reduce the rent extracted by the input suppliers.
Finally, we think our results could guide future empirical research on the wage e2ects
of mergers. The results in the received empirical literature are mixed. Some 3nd support
for a wage increase following a merger, some for a wage cut, while others 3nd no
e2ect at all. 32 If one in the same data material combines mergers with plant- and
3rm-speci3c unions, one might 3nd that mergers have – if any – only a limited e2ect
on wages. According to our results, the underlying truth could be that some mergers
result in wage drops while others give wage rises. A proper empirical test should
then start with a detailed study of the union structure which, in turn, should lead to
a discrimination in the data material between industries with plant- and 3rm-speci3c
unions.
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Appendix A. Equilibrium outcomes
A.1. No merger
The 3rst-order conditions of the downstream 3rms’ pro3t-maximising problems
determine the following input demand function for 3rm i:
li(w; b) =
2− b− (2 + b)wi + b
(∑3
j=1 wj − wi
)
2(2− b)(1 + b) : (A.1)
Using (A.1) to derive input prices and pro3ts in the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we
3nd that these are given by
wi =
(2− b)
2 + b− 2b ; (A.2)
i =
(2 + b)2(1− )2
4(1 + b)2(2 + b− 2b)2 : (A.3)
A.2. Plant-speci/c input suppliers
The input demand functions in the post-merger game are given by
l1(w; b) =
2(1− b)(2− b)− (4− b2)w1 + b(4− b)w2 + 2b(1− b)w3
4(2 + 2b− b2)(1− b) ; (A.4)
l2(w; b) =
2(1− b)(2− b)− (4− b2)w2 + b(4− b)w1 + 2b(1− b)w3
4(2 + 2b− b2)(1− b) ; (A.5)
l3(w; b) =
2− 2(1 + b)w3 + b(w1 + w2)
2(2 + 2b− b2) : (A.6)
Using (A.4)–(A.6), we derive the following input prices and pro3ts in the asymmetric
post-merger Nash equilibrium:
w1 = w2 =








(1− )2(2− b)2(2 + b)2(b+ 1)(2 + b+ b− b2)2
2(2 + 2b− b2)22 ; (A.9)
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3 =
(1− )2(1 + b)2(4− b2 − 5b2 + 2b3)2
(2 + 2b− b2)22 ; (A.10)
where
= 4 + 4b− 4b− b2 − 3b2 − 2 2b2 − b3 + b3 + 2 2b3¿ 0:
A.3. Firm-speci/c input suppliers
The input demand functions in the post-merger game are given by
l1(w; b) = l2(w; b) =
2(1− wm)− b(1− w3)
2(2 + 2b− b2) ; (A.11)
l3(w; b) =
1− (1 + b)w3 + bwm
2 + 2b− b2 : (A.12)
Input prices and pro3ts in the asymmetric post-merger Nash equilibrium are given by
wm =
(2 + b+ b− b2)
2 + 2b−  2b2 ; (A.13)
w3 =
(2 + 2b− b2)
2 + 2b−  2b2 ; (A.14)
m =
2(1− )2(1 + b)(2 + b+ b− b2)2
(2 + 2b−  2b2)2(2 + 2b− b2)2 ; (A.15)
3 =
(1− )2(1 + b)2(2 + 2b− b2)2
(2 + 2b−  2b2)2(2 + 2b− b2)2 : (A.16)
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) From (A.2) and (A.8), w3¿wi if
b2(1− )(4− 4− 4b+ 2b2 − b2)
(2 + b− 2b) ¿ 0:
The denominator is obviously positive for ∈ 〈0; 1〉, b∈ 〈0; 1〉. The numerator is posi-
tive if (4−4−4b+2b2−b2)¿ 0. Rearranging yields 4(1−(1+b))+b2(2−1)¿ 0.
We see that this condition holds if ¡ 12 or if b is suPciently low.
(ii) From (A.2) and (A.7), wi ¿w1 = w2 reduces to
b(1− )(4 + 4b− b2 − b3 − 2b2(1− b))
(2 + b− 2b) ¿ 0;
which holds for ∈ 〈0; 1〉, b∈ 〈0; 1〉.
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(iii) From (A.7) and (A.8), w3¿w1 = w2 reduces to
b(2b+ 1)(2− b)(1− )

¿ 0;
which is true for ∈ 〈0; 1〉, b∈ 〈0; 1〉.
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) A merger is pro3table if m − 2i ¿ 0. From Lemma 1
we know that this is true if  = 0 and b¡ 0:55. From Lemma 2 it must be the case
that this is also true for b¡ 0:55 and ¿ 0. For b¿ 0:55 we know (from Lemma 1)
that m−2i ¡ 0 if =0. Setting b=1, we can from (A.3) and (A.9) 3nd that m−2i
¿ 0 if
−9 + 138− 127 2 + 8 3(1 + )
72(2− 3)2 ¿ 0:
This condition is met if ¿ 0:07. Then we know that for ∈ 〈0; 1〉 and b∈ 〈0:55; 1〉
there are critical values where m = 2i. In Fig. 1 (Section 3) we have plotted the
curve where m=2i in a (; b)-diagram, using the expressions in (A.3) and (A.9). It
follows immediately that m¿ 2i above the curve.
(ii) A participant earns m=2 and the non-merging 3rm 3 in the post-merger equi-
librium. We know from Lemma 1 that for  = 0, then m − 23¡ 0. Setting b = 1
and using the expressions reported in (A.3) and (A.10), we have that m − 23¡ 0
if 20− 7 2¿ 4. This condition is met if ¡ 0:21. Then we know that for ∈ 〈0; 1〉
and b∈ 〈0; 1〉 there are critical values where m − 23 = 0: In Fig. 2 (Section 3), we
have plotted the curve where m = 23 in a (; b)-diagram, using the expressions in
(A.3) and (A.10). Obviously, m¿ 23 above the curve.
Proof of Lemma 3. From (A.2), (A.13) and (A.14), and after rearranging, wm¿w3
reduces to
b(1− b)(1− )
(2 + 2b−  2b2) ¿ 0;
whereas w3¿wi reduces to
b2(1− )(2 + 2− b)
(2 + 2b−  2b2)(2 + b− 2b) ¿ 0:
It can easily be seen that both inequalities hold for ∈ 〈0; 1〉, b∈ 〈0; 1〉.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) We know from Lemma 1 that if =0, then m¿ (¡)2i
if b¡ (¿) 0:55. From Lemma 3 it must also be the case that m¡ 2i if b¿ 0:55 and
¿ 0. Then we know that there are combinations of ∈ 〈0; 1〉 and b∈ 〈0; 0:55〉 such
that m=2i. By using the expressions in (A.3) and (A.15), we 3nd these combinations
of  and b. They are plotted in a (; b)-diagram in Fig. 3 (Section 4.1). Obviously,
m¡ 2i above the curve shown in Fig. 3.
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(ii) We know from Lemma 1 that for exogenous input prices, m¡ 23. Given
the result in Lemma 3, it is trivial to see that the result in Lemma 1 applies in this
case too.
Proof of Proposition 3. When comparing Md and Mn, the decisive group of owners
consists of the merger participants in Md. The comparison of equilibrium payo2s
in this case coincides with the case of 3rm-speci3c input suppliers in Section 4.1.
Let i(Mj) be the equilibrium pro3ts of 3rm i in ownership structure Mj. From Propo-
sition 2 we know that m(Md)¿ 2i(Mn), implying Md domMn, if b¡ 0:55 and  is
close to zero. For other parameter values, the dominance relation is reversed. Likewise,
when comparing Mc and Mn, the decisive owners are the merger participants in Mc.
This coincides with the case of plant-speci3c input suppliers in Section 3, and from
Proposition 1 we know that m(Mc)¿ 2i(Mn), implying Mc domMn, unless b¿ 0:55
and  is close to zero. For this (small) set of parameter values, the dominance relation
is reversed. Finally, when comparing Mc and Md, all three owners are decisive. In this
case, we have to compare total industry pro3ts in the two di2erent market structures.
This corresponds to a comparison of post-merger industry pro3ts for the case of plant-
and 3rm-speci3c input suppliers, respectively. Using (A.9), (A.10), (A.15) and (A.16)




i=1 i(Md), implying Mc domMd, for
the entire set of parameter values. Hence, Mc is undominated unless b¿ 0:55 and  is
close to zero, for which Mn is undominated.
Appendix C. Multi-plant mergers
Consider an industry with three 3rms and four brands. Firm A produces two brands,
1 and 2, at di2erent plants, whereas brands 3 and 4 are produced by 3rms B and C, re-
spectively. Brand i is produced with input supplied by the plant-speci3c input supplier i.
Ruling out the possibility of merger-to-monopoly by assumption, we can cover all pos-
sible market structures by considering two types of merger: a merger involving the
multi-plant 3rm (MI) and a merger between the two single-plant 3rms (MII).
Extending the symmetrical demand system (1) to four brands, and setting = 12 , we
3nd equilibrium input prices and pro3ts to be given by the following expressions.
1. No merger (M0)
w1(M0) = w2(M0) =
(1− b)(2− b)(4 + 5b− 2b2)
2(8 + 6b− 10b2 + b4) ; (C.1)
w3(M0) = w4(M0) =
(2− b)(4 + 2b− 5b2 + b3)
2(8 + 6b− 10b2 + b4) ; (C.2)
A(M0) =
(1 + b)3(2− b)4(4 + 5b− 2b2)2
8(2 + 3b− b2)2(8 + 6b− 10b2 + b4)2 ; (C.3)
B(M0) = C(M0) =
(2 + 2b− b2)2(4 + 2b− 5b2 + b3)2
4(2 + 3b− b2)2(8 + 6b− 10b2 + b4)2 : (C.4)
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2. Merger between /rms A and B (MI)
w1(MI) = w2(MI) = w3(MI) =
(1− b)(8 + 14b− 7b2)
16 + 32b− 7b2 − 5b3 ; (C.5)
w4(MI) =
(2− b)(4− b)(1 + 2b)
(16 + 32b− 7b2 − 5b3) ; (C.6)
A(MI) + B(MI) =
3(1 + 2b)(2 + 2b− b2)2(8 + 14b− 7b2)2
(4 + 8b− 3b2)2(16 + 32b− 7b2 − 5b3)2 ; (C.7)
C(MI) =
4(1 + 2b)2(8 + 10b− 11b2 + 2b3)2
(4 + 8b− 3b2)2(16 + 32b− 7b2 − 5b3)2 : (C.8)
3. Merger between /rms B and C (MII)
w1(MII) = w2(MII) = w3(MII) = w4(MII) =
2(1− b)
(4− b2) ; (C.9)
A(MII) = B(MII) + C(MII) =
(1 + b)(2 + 2b− b2)2
2(1 + 2b)2(4− b2)2 : (C.10)
We see that the input price responses of a merger follow a general pattern. Input
prices decrease for merger participants and increase for non-participants. Comparing
(C.1), (C.2) and (C.5), (C.6) we 3nd that w1(MI)−w1(M0)¡ 0, w3(MI)−w3(M0)¡ 0
and w4(MI)−w4(M0)¿ 0 for all b∈ 〈0; 1〉. Likewise, comparing (C.1), (C.2) and (C.9)
we have that w1(MII)− w1(M0)¿ 0 and w3(MII)− w3(M0)¡ 0 for all b∈ 〈0; 1〉.
Regarding merger pro3tability, a comparison of equilibrium pro3ts in the di2er-
ent market structures show that A(MI) + B(MI)¿A(M0) + B(M0) and B(MII) +
C(MII)¿B(M0) + C(M0) for all b∈ 〈0; 1〉. Thus, both types of merger are always
pro3table. Using the endogenous merger model presented in Section 5, the equilib-
rium market structure is in this case determined by a comparison of total industry





b¿ (¡) 0:75. Thus, the model predicts a merger between the two single-plant 3rms if
products are suPciently close substitutes, and a merger involving the multi-plant 3rm
otherwise.
References
BKarcena-Ruiz, J.C., GarzKon, M.B., 2000. Corporate merger, organizational form, and control of labor. Spanish
Economic Review 2, 129–144.
Baye, M.R., Crocker, K.J., Ju, J., 1996. Divisionalization, franchising, and divestiture incentives in oligopoly.
American Economic Review 86, 223–236.
Brander, J.A., Spencer, B.J., 1985. Export subsidies and market share rivalry. Journal of International
Economics 15, 313–321.
Buchanan, R.T., 1974. Merger waves in British unionism. Industrial Relations Journal 5, 37–44.
Buchanan, R.T., 1981. Mergers in British trade unions 1949–79. Industrial Relations Journal 12, 40–49.
742 K.E. Lommerud et al. / European Economic Review 49 (2005) 717–743
Bughin, J., 1999. The strategic choice of union-oligopoly bargaining agenda. International Journal of Industrial
Organization 17, 1029–1040.
Chitayat, G., 1979. Trade union mergers and labour conglomerates. Praeger, New York.
Creane, A., Davidson, C., 2001. Multidivisional 3rms, internal competition and the merger paradox.
Manuscript, Michigan State University.
Cremieux, P.-Y., Van Audenrode, M., 1996. Mergers and bargaining in the airline industry. Labour 10,
297–318.
Davidson, C., 1988. Multiunit bargaining in oligopolistic industries. Journal of Labor Economics 6,
397–422.
Deneckere, R., Davidson, C., 1985. Incentives to form coalitions with Bertrand competition. Rand Journal
of Economics 16, 473–486.
Dhillon, A., Petrakis, E., 2002. A generalised wage rigidity result. International Journal of Industrial
Organisation 20, 285–311.
Dowrick, S., 1989. Union–oligopoly bargaining. Economic Journal 99, 1123–1142.
Espinosa, M.P., Rhee, C., 1989. EPcient wage bargaining as a repeated game. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 104, 565–588.
Farrell, J., Shapiro, C., 1990a. Horizontal mergers: An equilibrium analysis. American Economic Review 80,
107–126.
Farrell, J., Shapiro, C., 1990b. Asset ownership and market structure in oligopoly. Rand Journal of Economics
21, 275–292.
Fridolfsson, S.-O., Stennek, J., 2002a. Holdup of anti-competitive mergers. Mimeo., Research Institute for
Industrial Economics (IUI).
Fridolfsson, S.-O., Stennek, J., 2002b. Why mergers reduce pro3ts and raise share-prices – a theory of
preemptive mergers. Mimeo, Research Institute for Industrial Economics (IUI).
Geroski, P., Knight, K.G., 1984. Corporate merger and collective bargaining in the UK. Industrial Relations
Journal 15, 51–60.
Gokhale, J., Groshen, E., Neumark, D., 1995. Do hostile takeovers reduce extramarginal wage payments?
Review of Economics and Statistics 77, 470–485.
GonzKalez-Maestre, M., LKopez-Cun˜at, J., 2001. Delegation and mergers in oligopoly. International Journal of
Industrial Organization 19, 1263–1279.
Hekmat, A., 1995. The e2ects of di2erent types of mergers on union and non-union wages in the United
States. Journal of Economics 21, 65–69.
Horn, H., Persson, L., 2001a. Endogenous mergers in concentrated markets. International Journal of Industrial
Organization 19, 1213–1244.
Horn, H., Persson, L., 2001b. The equilibrium ownership structure of an international oligopoly. Journal of
International Economics 53, 307–333.
Horn, H., Wolinsky, A., 1988a. Bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger. Rand Journal of Economics
19, 408–419.
Horn, H., Wolinsky, A., 1988b. Worker substitutability and patterns of unionisation. Economic Journal 98,
484–497.
Huck, S., Konrad, K.A., 2002. Merger pro3tability and trade policy. Mimeo., Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin
(WZB).
Huck, S., Konrad, K.A., MVuller, W., 2003. Pro3table horizontal mergers without cost advantages: The role
of internal organisation, information, and market structure. Economica, forthcoming.
Lommerud, K.E., SHrgard, L., 1997. Merger and product range rivalry. International Journal of Industrial
Organization 16, 21–42.
Lommerud, K.E, Straume, O.R., SHrgard, L., 2000. Merger pro3tability in unionized oligopoly. Working
Paper in Economics No. 10/2000, University of Bergen.
Lommerud, K.E., Meland, F., SHrgard, L., 2003. Unionised oligopoly, trade liberalisation and location choice.
Economic Journal, forthcoming.
McAfee, R.P., Williams, M.A., 1992. Horizontal mergers and anti-trust policy. Journal of Industrial
Economics 40, 181–187.
McGuckin, R.H., Nguyen, S.V., Reznak, A.P., 1995. The impact of ownership change on employment, wages
and labor productivity in U.S. manufacturing 1977–87. Discussion Paper 95/08, Bureau of the Census,
Center for Economic Studies.
K.E. Lommerud et al. / European Economic Review 49 (2005) 717–743 743
Naylor, R., 1998. International trade and economic integration when labour markets are generally unionised.
European Economic Review 42, 1251–1267.
NorbVack, P.-J., Persson, L., 2002. Investment liberalization – who bene3ts from cross-border mergers and
acquisitions? Discussion Paper No. 3166, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Peoples, J., Hekmat, A., Moini, A.H., 1993. Corporate mergers and union wage premiums. Journal of
Economics and Finance 17, 65–75.
Perry, M.K., Porter, R.H., 1985. Oligopoly and the incentives for horizontal merger. American Economic
Review 75, 219–227.
Petrakis, E., Vlassis, M., 2000. Endogenous scope of bargaining in oligopoly. Labour Economics 7,
261–281.
Salant, S., Switzer, S., Reynolds, R.J., 1983. Losses from horizontal merger: The e2ects of an exogenous
change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 185–199.
Stigler, G.J., 1950. Monopoly and oligopoly by merger. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings
40, 23–34.
Straume, O.R., 2002. Union collusion and intra-industry trade. International Journal of Industrial Organization
20, 631–652.
Straume, O.R., 2003. International mergers and trade liberalisation: Implications for unionised labour.
International Journal of Industrial Organization 21, 717–735.
UNCTAD, 2000. World investment report 2000: Overview, United Nations (available at http://www.unctad.org).
Ziss, S., 2001. Horizontal mergers and delegation. International Journal of Industrial Organization 19,
471–492.
